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OPINION OF THE COURT  
______________________ 
 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 The principal question presented by this appeal is 
whether videotapes that focus on the genitalia and pubic area of 
minor females constitute a "lascivious exhibition of the genitals 
4 
or pubic area" under the federal child pornography laws, 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(2), (4) and 2256(2)(E) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), 
even though these body parts are covered by clothing.  When this 
case first came before us, we held that such visual depictions do 
qualify as lascivious exhibitions and that this interpretation 
does not render the statute unconstitutionally overbroad.  United 
States v. Knox, 977 F.2d 815, 820-23 (3d Cir. 1992), vacated and 
remanded, __ U.S. __, 114 S. Ct. 375 (1993). 
 At the Supreme Court's instruction, we have further 
considered this case "in light of the position asserted by the 
Solicitor General in his brief for the United States," Knox v. 
United States, __ U.S. __, 114 S. Ct. 375 (1993).  In that brief 
and in its subsequent brief filed in this court after the Supreme 
Court remand, the government argues that the plain language of 
the statute requires the genitals or pubic area exhibited to be 
at least somewhat visible or discernible through the child's 
clothing.  We hold that the federal child pornography statute, on 
its face, contains no nudity or discernibility requirement, that 
non-nude visual depictions, such as the ones contained in this 
record, can qualify as lascivious exhibitions, and that this 
construction does not render the statute unconstitutionally 
overbroad.  Finally, we again conclude that the government 
presented sufficient evidence at the bench trial to establish 
both the necessary mens rea and the delivery of the films through 
interstate mail.  We thus will reaffirm Knox's conviction. 
 
I. 
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 In March of 1991, the U.S. Customs International Branch 
intercepted a mailing to France which contained a request that 
two videos, "Little Girl Bottoms (Underside)" and "Little 
Blondes," be sent to J. Richard Scott, 210 West Hamilton Avenue, 
No. 108, State College, Pennsylvania.  The parcel also contained 
a check drawn on the account of defendant Stephen A. Knox and 
bearing his signature.  The check listed his address as 210 East 
Hamilton Avenue, No. 25, State College, Pennsylvania.  A second 
envelope addressed to J. Richard Scott from the Netherlands also 
was confiscated and contained a catalog advertising for sale 
videotapes depicting nude, semi-clothed, and clothed minors. 
Aware that Knox previously had been convicted of receiving child 
pornography through the mail, the customs investigators obtained 
a search warrant and with the assistance of the Pennsylvania 
State Police searched his apartment.0 
 The police officers seized three video cassettes 
produced by the Nather Company (hereafter "Nather Tapes"), a 
videotape distribution company based in Las Vegas, Nevada.  A 
catalogue from the Nather Company with checkmarks next to several 
video selections was also removed from Knox's apartment.  One of 
the marked videos in the brochure corresponded to a segment of a 
compilation tape which was seized.  Envelopes addressed to Nather 
and Nather mail order forms were discovered as well as a carbon 
                     
0The district court determined that the search of Knox's 
apartment did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and Knox does not 
contest this decision on appeal. 
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copy of a money order payable to Nather Company for an amount 
approximately equal to the price of a single video. 
 The tapes contained numerous vignettes of teenage and 
preteen females, between the ages of ten and seventeen, striking 
provocative poses for the camera.  The children were obviously 
being directed by someone off-camera.  All of the children wore 
bikini bathing suits, leotards, underwear, or other abbreviated 
attire while they were being filmed.  The government conceded 
that no child in the films was nude, and that the genitalia and 
pubic areas of the young girls were always concealed by an 
abbreviated article of clothing.  The photographer would zoom in 
on the children's pubic and genital area and display a close-up 
view for an extended period of time.  Most of the videotapes were 
set to music.  In some sequences, the child subjects were dancing 
or gyrating in a fashion not natural for their age.  The films 
themselves and the promotional brochures distributed by Nather 
demonstrate that the videotapes clearly were designed to pander 
to pedophiles. 
 The United States prosecuted Knox based exclusively on 
the three Nather tapes.  Knox was indicted on two counts: (1) 
knowingly receiving through the mail visual depictions of a minor 
engaged in sexually explicit conduct; and (2) knowingly 
possessing three or more videotapes that contain a visual 
depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) and (4).  "Sexually explicit 
conduct" for both of these offenses is defined to include a 
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"lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area."  Id. 
§2256(2)(E). 
 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b), 
Knox filed a pre-trial motion to dismiss the indictment 
contending that the videos did not contain an "exhibition" of the 
genitals or pubic area since these areas were always covered by 
underwear, leotards, or a bathing suit.  Knox and the government 
agreed to a pre-trial hearing to determine whether the indictment 
was facially sufficient.  The district judge viewed portions of 
the Nather tapes which the parties stipulated were representative 
of the material contained in the videos.  To determine the 
meaning of the statutory language "exhibition of the . . . pubic 
area," the district court looked to the plain meaning of the 
words.  Since the pubic area is located directly adjacent to the 
genitalia, the district court concluded that other areas in close 
proximity to the genitals, specifically the "uppermost portion of 
the inner thigh," were also included in the statutory definition 
of the pubic area.  District Court Memorandum at 14; App. at 41. 
Since the upper portion of the inner thigh was clearly exposed, 
the court held that the tapes contained an exhibition of the 
pubic area, and therefore denied Knox's motion to dismiss the 
indictment. 
 Knox waived his right to a jury trial and a bench trial 
was held.  At the bench trial, all of the exhibits and testimony 
from the pre-trial hearing were incorporated into the record for 
purposes of the trial.  Additionally, the government admitted 
into evidence advertising catalogues from Nather, Nather mail 
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order forms, and envelopes addressed to the Nather Company which 
were seized from Knox's apartment.  The catalogues described in 
detail the contents and intended effect of the films that could 
be purchased: 
"Sassy Sylphs" will blow your mind so completely you'll 
be begging for mercy. 
 Just look at what we have in this incredible tape: 
about 14 girls between the ages of 11 and 17 showing so 
much panty and ass you'll get dizzy.  There are panties 
showing under shorts and under dresses and skirts; 
there are boobs galore and T-back (thong) bathing suits 
on girls as young as 15 that are so revealing it's 
almost like seeing them naked (some say even better). 
 
District Court Memorandum at 11; App. at 38. 
 
 The government also introduced evidence to establish 
that Nather mailed the tapes from its office in Nevada to the 
mailbox which Knox had rented under a fictitious name.  Finally, 
the carbon copy of a sixty-two dollar money order payable to 
Nather was admitted to prove the method of payment.  Although 
Knox did not testify and called no defense witnesses, he 
introduced magazine advertisements for Nather's videotapes which 
claimed that the absence of complete nudity rendered the tapes 
legal to purchase and possess. 
 The district court found Knox guilty on both counts. 
Thereafter, on February 13, 1992, Knox filed a motion for a 
judgment of acquittal or, alternatively, as he styled it, an 
application for a hearing to explore the anatomical issue decided 
by the court, predicated upon the contention that the uppermost 
portion of the inner thigh is not the pubic area.  In conjunction 
with this motion, Knox submitted the affidavit of Dr. Todd Olsen, 
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Director of Human Gross Anatomy at the Albert Einstein College of 
Medicine.  The affidavit of Dr. Olsen stated that defining the 
pubic area to encompass the uppermost portion of the inner thigh 
is anatomically incorrect.  Since the motion was filed three 
months after entry of the verdict, the district court denied the 
motion as untimely.  Knox was sentenced to the minimum mandatory 
term of imprisonment of five years for each count, to be served 
concurrently.  The sentence has been stayed pending the outcome 
of this appeal. 
 Knox appealed the denial of the motion to dismiss the 
indictment, the guilty verdict, and the denial of the post-trial 
motion for judgment of acquittal.0  We upheld Knox's conviction. 
In doing so, we interpreted the statutory phrase "exhibition of 
the genitals or pubic area" as encompassing the lascivious focus 
on these body parts even though they were always covered by 
underwear, leotards, or other thin but opaque clothing.  United 
                     
0In our prior consideration of this case, we addressed as a 
preliminary matter whether we had jurisdiction to review the 
issues presented in Knox's untimely post-trial motion for a 
judgment of acquittal.  See United States v. Knox, 977 F.2d 815, 
818-19 (3d Cir. 1992) (Part II), vacated and remanded, __ U.S. 
__, 114 S. Ct. 375 (1993).  We decided not to address the merits 
of the motion because we concluded that the district court had 
not abused its discretion in declining to entertain it in the 
first instance.  Id. at 819.  We next addressed whether a nude 
display of the uppermost portion a minor subject's inner thighs 
can be a lascivious exhibition of the pubic area.  Id. at 819-20 
(Part III).  We concluded that it could not because this portion 
of the human anatomy is not part of the pubic area as defined in 
the most widely accepted human anatomy treatises.  Id. at 819. 
Because neither Knox nor the government, nor any of the various 
amici parties, have argued that those conclusions are erroneous, 
we need not address them in this opinion other than to say that 
we adhere to the analysis and conclusions set forth in our prior 
opinion which was vacated by the Supreme Court. 
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States v. Knox, 977 F.2d 815, 820-23 (3d Cir. 1992), vacated and 
remanded, __ U.S. __, 114 S. Ct. 375 (1993).  We are the first, 
and to date only,0 court which has interpreted the statute to 
allow for a conviction under these circumstances. 
 
II. 
 After we affirmed his conviction, Knox successfully 
petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari.  See Knox v. 
United States, __ U.S. __, 113 S. Ct. 2926 (1993).  In his 
petition for certiorari, Knox presented four issues, most of 
which focus on whether there can be an "exhibition of the 
genitals or pubic area" under 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(E) where the 
genitals and pubic area are fully covered by an article of 
clothing.0  In its brief opposing the grant of certiorari, the 
                     
0According to several of the briefs submitted to this court, 
Knox's prosecution is the only one that has been brought by the 
government where the criminal materials at issue do not contain 
any nudity at all.  The government did not dispute this 
contention in its brief or at oral argument after remand from the 
Supreme Court.  Thus, for purposes of this appeal we will assume 
that the contention is true.  Of course, we recognize that a 
prosecutor always has broad discretion to decide the 
circumstances that warrant prosecution of a person for what the 
prosecutor fairly believes is unlawful conduct.  When the 
prosecutor decides to prosecute, however, it is the exclusive 
function of the judiciary to determine whether the conduct 
charged is unlawful unless the prosecutor then withdraws the 
prosecution. 
0The four questions presented by Knox in his petition for 
certiorari are the following: 
 
1) Whether there can be an "exhibition of the genitals 
or pubic area" under 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(E) where the 
genitals and pubic area are fully covered by an article 
of clothing. 
2) Where no other prosecution has ever been brought and 
no other arrest has ever been made charging an 
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government supported the theory we adopted in upholding Knox's 
conviction.  After the grant of certiorari, and the change in 
administration following President Clinton's election, the 
government took a different position. 
 The government's new position is that while complete 
nudity is not absolutely required for a depiction to constitute a 
criminal "exhibition," this court "erred in holding that simply 
focusing on the midsection of a clothed body may constitute an 
'exhibition' of the unrevealed body parts beneath the garments." 
Gov't Sup. Ct. Brief (Sept. 1993) at 10.  In the government's 
view, a criminal "exhibition" requires both that the visual 
depiction focus in on the body parts and that it render them 
visible or discernible in some fashion.  Id. 
 Reviewing the legislative history, the government noted 
that the Justice Department in 1977 had made a suggestion to 
                                                                  
exhibition of the genitals which were fully covered by 
an article of clothing, and the defendant knew that the 
videotape contained no nudity and was told that the 
videotape was therefore legal, did the government 
introduce sufficient proof of scienter to support a 
guilty verdict? 
3) Where no other prosecution has ever been brought and 
no other arrest has ever been made charging an 
exhibition of the genitals which were fully covered by 
an article of clothing, is an objectively reasonable 
good faith belief in the legality of the depiction a 
valid affirmative defense? 
4) Assuming arguendo that there can be an "exhibition 
of the genitals or pubic area" under 18 U.S.C. 
§2256(2)(E) where the genitals and pubic area are fully 
covered by clothing, is 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(E) 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad? 
 
Knox's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (Sup. Ct. No. 92-1183, 
October Term, 1992) at (i). 
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substitute the phrase "lewd exhibition of the genitals or pubic 
area" for a more vague phrase in order to more clearly delineate 
"what types of nude portrayals of children were intended to be 
encompassed" within the statute.  Id. at 11 (quoting Protection 
of Children Against Sexual Exploitation: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 77-78 (1977), reprinted 
in 1978 U.S.S.C.A.N. 63 (letter from Patricia M. Wald, Assistant 
Attorney General to James O. Eastland, Chairman, Committee of the 
Judiciary)) (emphasis added by government).  The government reads 
this legislative history as an indication that Congress only 
intended to criminalize depictions that are at least partly nude 
in nature.  In our prior opinion, we distinguished this 
legislative history by noting that the language of the Wald 
letter assumed that Congress only intended to criminalize nude 
depictions because the language of the bill at that time 
contained the word "nudity." 
 As to the scope of nudity required, the government did 
not go so far as to agree with Knox that complete nudity is 
required.  Rather, the government asserted that Congress intended 
to criminalize depictions of genitals that are at least somewhat 
visible.  Id. at 11-12.  Thus, the government stated that a 
child's genitals which are covered by a transparent or nearly 
transparent garment, or clothing that is so tight as to reveal 
completely the contours of the genitals, would constitute a 
criminal "exhibition" within the meaning of the statute.  Id. at 
13 
12.0  Ultimately, the government believes that the child's 
genitals or pubic area must be "discernible" through his or her 
tight clothing in order for the exhibition to be child 
pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(E). 
 The government put forth a second reason why our prior 
opinion could not be fully supported.  Relying on the 
introductory statutory language which states that § 2252(a) 
covers only depictions involving "the use of a minor engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct," 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (emphasis added), 
the government concluded that a criminal "exhibition" exists only 
where "the minors who appear in the videotapes can be said to 
have been acting or posing lasciviously."  Gov't Sup. Ct. Brief 
(Sept. 1993) at 13.  Thus, according to the government's 
position, the appropriate inquiry is on whether the child 
lasciviously poses her (or someone else's) genitals or pubic 
area.  See id.  Because neither this court nor the district court 
interpreted the statute in this fashion, the government requested 
that the Supreme Court vacate the judgment and remand for 
reconsideration in light of the "correct" statutory standard. 
 The government also addressed two related issues in its 
Supreme Court brief.  First, it argued that adoption of the 
advocated statutory standard would not render the statute 
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.  Id. 14-17.0  Finally, the 
                     
0The government acknowledged that the adoption of such a standard 
would be more easily applied to depictions of boys than girls 
because of obvious anatomical differences.  Id. at 12 n.3. 
0We rejected Knox's arguments concerning overbreadth in our prior 
opinion by finding the term "lascivious" as the limiting 
principle.  See Knox, 977 F.2d at 823. 
14 
government supported that part of our prior opinion which 
rejected Knox's argument that he did not possess the necessary 
mens rea to violate the child pornography statute because he did 
not know the illegal nature of the contents of the videos, and 
because he relied on disclaimers which accompanied the videotapes 
from their commercial source.  Id. at 17-20; see also Knox, 977 
F.2d at 824-25. 
 In the final section of its Supreme Court brief, the 
government stated that the videotapes at issue in this case might 
be deemed unlawful under the statutory standard advocated in its 
brief.  Because we did not interpret the statute consistently 
with the government's new position, the government requested that 
the case "be remanded so that the Court of Appeals can assess the 
sufficiency of the evidence under the proper legal standard." 
Gov't Sup. Ct. Brief (Sept. 1993) at 20.  The government 
clarified that the only task necessary on remand was for this 
court "simply to determine whether the evidence was sufficient, 
under the correct legal standard, to support a general verdict of 
guilty."  Id. at 23. 
 Upon the close of briefing in the Supreme Court, but 
before the case was argued, the Court vacated the judgment and 
remanded.  See Knox v. United States, __ U.S. __, 114 S. Ct. 375 
(1993).  The Supreme Court's mandate states the following: "The 
judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit for further consideration 
in light of the position asserted by the Solicitor General in his 
brief for the United States filed September 17, 1993."  Id.  Our 
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charge on remand is to further consider our interpretation of the 
statute in light of the interpretation advanced by the government 
in its brief to the Supreme Court.0 
 
III. 
 Before turning to the merits of the case, we must 
address one procedural issue.  After the Supreme Court vacated 
the judgment and remanded the case for further consideration, on 
December 23, 1993 the government filed a Motion to (further) 
Remand the case to the district court.  This motion was made 
during the new briefing schedule established by us on November 
17, 1993.  The government's motion sought an immediate remand for 
the purpose of a retrial in the district court to be conducted 
according to the interpretation of § 2256(2)(E) advocated by the 
government. 
 In its motion, the government stated that at the new 
trial, if granted, it intends to introduce evidence which was not 
offered at the original trial pursuant to an agreement between 
Knox and the government whereby the defense agreed to a bench 
trial in return for use at trial of only certain specified 
videotapes (i.e., the three Nather tapes).  The government 
                     
0After the Supreme Court remanded the case, we granted amicus 
curiae status to five interested parties, all of which have 
submitted briefs in this court.  Four of the amici parties urge 
us to reaffirm Knox's conviction on the theory adopted in our 
prior opinion: 234 Members of Congress; The Institute for Media 
Education; National Law Center for Children and Families et al.; 
and National Family Legal Foundation and Morality in Media.  The 
final amicus party, American Booksellers Foundation for Free 
Expression et al., supports Knox and argues that he should be 
acquitted of the child pornography charges. 
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requested a suspension of the briefing schedule and an immediate 
remand to the district court.  We entered an order denying the 
government's request for an immediate remand and a suspension of 
the briefing schedule; we did, however, inform the parties that 
we would further consider the merits of the government's motion 
following the briefing schedule and oral argument. 
 Other than the arguments made in the December 23, 1993 
Motion to Remand, the government has not further briefed this 
issue.  In its brief on the merits, however, the government 
renews its request that we remand the case to the district court 
for a new trial.  Gov't Brief (March 1994) at 28. 
 The government argues that a remand is in order because 
it has espoused a standard for interpreting the child pornography 
statute that was not used by this court in reviewing the 
conviction, and that was not used by the district court at trial. 
Thus, the government believes that Knox should be retried 
according to the standard urged by the government.  According to 
the government, a retrial would require factual determinations 
concerning the evidence which would be inappropriate for this 
court to make, specifically factual findings as to whether any of 
the depictions in the videos reveal pubic areas or genitalia 
which are discernible through the opaque clothing.  For this 
reason, as well as others, the government seeks a remand to the 
district court for a new trial. 
 In its Motion to Remand, the government also noted that 
in his reply brief filed in the Supreme Court, Knox requested a 
remand to the district court in the event the Supreme Court 
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agreed with the government concerning the newly proposed 
interpretation of the child pornography statute.  As noted 
previously, the government admitted in its motion that if we 
agree to a remand, it will seek to introduce different evidence 
at trial.  The government argues that this is still the 
appropriate course for the case at this juncture given that this 
court will have a full opportunity to review the district court's 
application of the proposed statutory standard in the event that 
Knox is convicted again. 
 Following the remand from the Supreme Court, Knox now 
opposes the government's motion to remand the case.  First, Knox 
argues that a remand for a new trial arguably would run directly 
contrary to the Supreme Court's mandate for us to reconsider our 
previous opinion "in light of the position asserted by the 
Solicitor General," Knox, __ U.S. __, 114 S. Ct. 375.0  Knox also 
argues that the government's new position raises an ambiguity 
concerning the statute to which the rule of lenity must be 
applied.  Although Knox has not fully briefed this argument, he 
contends that jeopardy has attached and that appellate review of 
the trial record might result in his acquittal as a matter of 
law.  Thus, Knox argues that a remand for the purpose of giving 
the government a second bite at the evidentiary apple would be 
                     
0Knox, noting that the case has created a political firestorm, 
therefore believes that the government wishes to avoid criticism 
by using additional evidence to gain a conviction in a new trial 
because the existing record does not contain sufficient evidence 
to uphold the conviction under the "discernible genitals" 
standard proposed by the government.  We express no opinion 
concerning this contention. 
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constitutionally inappropriate as a violation of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
 Amici curiae parties, including the amici Members of 
Congress, also filed answers in opposition to the government's 
motion for remand.  The amici parties make several arguments as 
to why granting the motion would be inappropriate.  Essentially, 
they argue that a remand would arguably violate the Supreme 
Court's mandate, that the only disputed issue is legal in nature 
and should be decided by this court, and that Supreme Court 
precedent does not support the view that if at some time during 
the proceeding both parties seek a remand to the district court, 
that an appellate court must adhere to that request. 
 We will deny the government's Motion to Remand because 
we believe that an immediate remand to the district court for 
purposes of conducting a retrial without first deciding the legal 
issue before us would violate the Supreme Court's mandate to this 
court.  The Supreme Court vacated our judgment and remanded the 
case to us, not the district court, "for further consideration in 
light of the position asserted by the Solicitor General in his 
brief for the United States."  Knox v. United States, __ U.S. __, 
114 S. Ct. 375 (1993). 
 In the government's Supreme Court brief, the Solicitor 
General merely argued that the interpretation of the child 
pornography statute adopted in our prior opinion was legally 
incorrect.  The government advocated the adoption of a different 
statutory standard, one that requires the contours of the 
genitalia or pubic area to be discernible through the opaque 
19 
clothing in order for possession of the material to be criminal. 
By remanding the case to this court for further consideration in 
the first instance, the Supreme Court declined to address the 
purely legal question presented. 
 Although the government's Supreme Court brief did at 
one point request a remand to this court or the district court, 
it did so only for the purpose of applying the legal standard 
newly espoused by the government.0  The government never argued 
in its Supreme Court brief that the case ought to be remanded to 
the district court in order for the prosecution to introduce 
additional evidence which, if admitted, might moot the entire 
statutory interpretation issue which confronted the Supreme Court 
                     
0The government's Supreme Court brief refers to or advocates a 
remand in five different places.  See Gov't Sup. Ct. Brief (Sept. 
1993) at 9-10, 13, 20, and 23 (both in Part IV and Conclusion). 
At only one point in the brief did the government mention a 
remand to the district court.  See id. at 20.  There, the 
government stated: "[I]f the Court agrees that an incorrect 
construction of the statutory phrase was used below, the 
appropriate disposition is to remand the case to the court of 
appeals for application either by that court or the district 
court of the correct standard to the facts of this case."  Id. 
(emphasis added).  Thus, even where the brief did mention the 
district court, it did so only for the purpose of indicating that 
the appropriate trier of fact should apply the law once it has 
been adopted or clarified by this court (the court of appeals). 
Even here the government's Supreme Court brief advocated a remand 
to this court for reconsideration of the purely legal issue of 
statutory interpretation.  At no point did the government's 
Supreme Court brief mention the possibility of introducing new 
evidence at trial if it were to be remanded to the district 
court.  Finally, in the Conclusion section of its brief, the 
government explicitly requested "a remand to the court of appeals 
for further proceedings," not to the district court for a new 
trial.  See id. at 23.  Given that the government sought a remand 
to this court by the Supreme Court, the Court's simply worded 
mandate that this court further consider our statutory 
interpretation makes perfect sense. 
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and now confronts this court on remand.  But that is just the 
course the government now advocates with its Motion to Remand. 
 If we were to agree to an immediate remand to the 
district court for the purpose of holding a retrial with 
additional evidence, we would be disposing of the case in a 
manner that was not presented to or contemplated by the Supreme 
Court.  Given that the Supreme Court did not consider the 
government's requested disposition as an option, it ordered us to 
further consider our prior interpretation of the child 
pornography statute in light of the newly advanced standard 
espoused by the government.  If we fail to address the legal 
issue directly presented by the Solicitor General's brief and the 
Supreme Court mandate, then arguably we will be ignoring simple 
instructions from our higher authority.  Furthermore, in light of 
our disposition upholding Knox's conviction after further 
consideration, the issue of a remand to the district court for a 
new trial is moot. 
 Finally, it is important to address another aspect of 
the government's Motion to Remand.  In several instances the 
government argues that a remand to the district court is exactly 
the remedy Knox sought in the Supreme Court in the event that the 
Court agreed that we had adopted the wrong statutory standard. 
However, Knox requested this disposition only in the Supreme 
Court, not in this court, and only before the government proposed 
a remand to the district court for the purpose of introducing 
additional evidence during the retrial. 
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 Knox sought a remand to the district court for a new 
trial only if the Supreme Court adopted the government's 
"discernible genitals" statutory standard, because in Knox's view 
the record evidence does not support a conviction even under that 
standard.  Therefore, the government's position that the case 
should be immediately remanded to the district court for a new 
trial using additional evidence is not advanced in any fashion by 
the fact that Knox sought a remand from the Supreme Court before 
the government revealed it would attempt to introduce different 
evidence in the event a new trial was granted.  It is logical for 
a convicted criminal defendant to seek the alternative remedy of 
a remand for a new trial in the event an appellate court does not 
agree that the conviction cannot stand because the evidence was 
insufficient to convict.  In this case, however, the Supreme 
Court did not address the legal issue, instead leaving it for us 
to address in the first instance. 
 Under these circumstances, Knox now opposes a remand to 
the district court for a new trial using additional evidence and 
it is not relevant that in the Supreme Court Knox requested a 
remand to the district court as an alternative remedy to that of 
an outright acquittal for insufficiency of evidence.  See, e.g., 
Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 79, 105 S. Ct. 479, 484 
(1984) ("[P]rivate agreements between litigants, especially those 
disowned, cannot relieve this Court of performance of its 
judicial function.  It is our responsibility to interpret the 
intent of Congress . . . irrespective of petitioners' or 
respondent's prior or present views.").  Since we will deny the 
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government's Motion to Remand because granting it would violate 
the Supreme Court's mandate, we need not address whether adopting 
such a course would implicate double jeopardy concerns. 
 
IV. 
 We now turn to the merits of the case on remand.  The 
Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, 
as subsequently amended, criminalizes knowingly receiving through 
the mail visual depictions of a minor engaged in sexually 
explicit conduct and knowingly possessing three or more 
videotapes which contain a visual depiction of a minor engaging 
in sexually explicit conduct.  18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), (4). 
"Sexually explicit conduct" for purposes of both of these 
offenses is defined to include the "lascivious exhibition of the 
genitals or pubic area."  Id. § 2256(2)(E).  In our prior 
opinion, we held that the statute contains no nudity requirement 
because the above quoted statutory phrase refers to a "lascivious 
exhibition," not a nude or naked exhibition.  Knox, 977 F.2d at 
820.  Our review of the relevant legislative history revealed 
that Knox had not met his burden of demonstrating that Congress 
clearly intended the statute only to proscribe nude or partially 
nude displays of the genitals or pubic area.  Id. at 820-21. 
Because the meaning of the statutory phrase "lascivious 
exhibition" under 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(E) poses a pure question of 
law, our review is plenary.  United States v. Brown, 862 F.2d 
1033, 1036 (3d Cir. 1988). 
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 Defendant Knox continues to assert that the genitals or 
pubic area must be unclad or nude, and fully exposed to the 
camera, before an exhibition may occur.  Several amici parties, 
including the amici Members of Congress, support our prior 
statutory interpretation that no nudity is required.  The 
government contends that the pictorial representation of the 
genitals or pubic area, covered only by underwear, a bikini 
bathing suit, a leotard, or other abbreviated attire, constitutes 
a lascivious exhibition if (1) those body parts are at least 
somewhat visible in the videotapes, and (2) the minors were 
engaged in conduct that can be judged "lascivious." 
 When interpreting a statute, the starting point is 
always the language of the statute itself.  American Tobacco Co. 
v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68, 102 S. Ct. 1534, 1537 (1982). 
Courts presume that Congress expressed its legislative intent 
through the ordinary meaning of the words it chose to use, 
Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9, 82 S. Ct. 585, 591 
(1962); Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 100 S. Ct. 311, 
314 (1979), and if the statutory language is clear, it is not 
necessary to glean congressional intent from legislative history, 
TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 n.29, 98 S. Ct. 2279, 2296 n.29 
(1978); Barnes v. Cohen, 749 F.2d 1009, 1013 (3d Cir. 1984), 
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1061, 105 S. Ct. 2126 (1985).  Thus, it is 
axiomatic that when the statutory language is clear, the words 
must be interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning. 
Dewalt v. Sullivan, 963 F.2d 27, 30 (3d Cir. 1992).  Only the 
most extraordinary showing of contrary congressional intent may 
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justify altering the plain meaning of a statutory term.  Malloy 
v. Eichler, 860 F.2d 1179, 1183 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 Knox attempts to read a nudity requirement into a 
statute which has none.  The amended Protection of Children 
Against Sexual Exploitation Act criminalizes the "lascivious 
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area."  18 U.S.C. 
§2256(2)(E).  In ordinary legal usage, the word "exhibit" means 
"[t]o show or display; to offer or present for inspection." 
Black's Law Dictionary 573 (6th ed. 1990).  The genitals or pubic 
area need not be fully or partially nude in order to be shown or 
put on display.  This plain meaning of the term "exhibition" is 
confirmed by reference to a popular dictionary of the English 
language, which defines "exhibit" as "[t]o display; as:  a. [t]o 
present for consideration; set forth . . . .  b. [t]o present to 
view; to show, esp. in order to attract notice to what is 
interesting or instructive," Webster's New International 
Dictionary 893 (2d ed. 1959). 
 Despite our understanding that the ordinary meaning of 
the term "exhibition" does not require nudity, the government 
urges us to adopt an intermediate statutory standard which 
requires that the depiction in question render the minor's 
genitals or pubic area visible or discernible in some fashion in 
order to constitute an exhibition.  The government attempts to 
provide support for its "discernible genitals" standard from the 
plain meaning of the statutory terms and from the legislative 
history.  First, the government argues that the ordinary meaning 
of the term "exhibition," as used in the statute, contemplates 
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that the genitals or pubic area of the minors depicted must be 
visible or discernible in some fashion.  Absent some visibility 
or discernibility of the genitals or pubic area, the government 
in effect agrees with Knox that the depiction is an exhibition of 
the clothing covering the body parts, rather than an exhibition 
of the body parts themselves. 
 In support of this reading of the statute, Knox makes 
reference to an analogy between the depictions contained in the 
Nather tapes and an art exhibition.  He argues that a celebrated 
piece of sculpture such as Michelangelo's David would not be 
exhibited or on display at all if there was an opaque dropcloth 
covering the sculpture from head to toe.  The government in 
essence agrees, although it concedes that there would be an 
exhibition of the sculpture if the David's prominent features 
were discernible or otherwise visible through the dropcloth. 
 We disagree with this reasoning because we believe that 
the analogy entirely misses the mark.  It may well be that if a 
work of art is completely covered, any and all of its meaning and 
value to an observer is lost.  That is, any and all of the 
magnificent qualities which one seeks from viewing the David are 
destroyed by completely covering the statue.  In this sense, the 
completely covered work of art is not being exhibited.  In 
contrast, it is not true that by scantily and barely covering the 
genitals of young girls that the display of the young girls in 
seductive poses destroys the value of the poses to the viewer of 
child pornography.  Although the genitals are covered, the 
display and focus on the young girls' genitals or pubic area 
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apparently still provides considerable interest and excitement 
for the pedophile observer, or else there would not be a market 
for the tapes in question in this case.  Thus, the scantily clad 
genitals or pubic area of young girls can be "exhibited" in the 
ordinary sense of that word, and in fact were exhibited in the 
tapes which are the subject of Knox's conviction.  The analogy 
made by Knox and the government to exhibitions of covered works 
of art fails on its own terms. 
 In any event, we are not called on in this case to 
interpret the imaginary statutory phrase "art exhibition." 
Rather, we are called upon to decipher Congress' intent 
concerning the statutory phrase "lascivious exhibition of the 
genitals or pubic area" as used in the federal child pornography 
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(E).  Thus, we must focus not on what 
would or would not constitute an art exhibition, but rather on 
whether the ordinary meaning of the term "lascivious exhibition" 
includes the fully covered genitals or pubic area of minor 
children. 
 In pursuing this task, we believe the principle that 
"[w]ords take on meaning in the company of other words," St. 
Surin v. Virgin Islands Daily News, Inc., No. 93-7553, slip op. 
at 13 (3d Cir. Apr. 15, 1994), is relevant when interpreting 
terms contained in a statute which Congress passed to curb a 
particular evil.  See Deal v. United States, __ U.S. __, __, 113 
S. Ct. 1993, 1996 (1993) (it is a "fundamental principle of 
statutory construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that the 
meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be 
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drawn from the context in which it is used").  As discussed more 
fully below, Congress aimed the federal child pornography statute 
at combatting "the use of children as subjects of pornographic 
materials[, which] is harmful to the physiological, emotional, 
and mental health of the child."  New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 
747, 758, 102 S. Ct. 3348, 3355 (1982); see also id. at 758 n.9, 
102 S. Ct. at 3355 n.9.  In so doing, Congress defined the 
"lascivious exhibition of genitals or pubic area" as one variety 
of "sexually explicit conduct" proscribed by the statute.  Thus, 
we find it more meaningful to focus on the ordinary meaning of 
the statutory term "lascivious exhibition," rather than simply 
focusing on the term "exhibition" divorced entirely from the 
context in which it was used. 
 The term "lascivious" is defined as "[t]ending to 
excite lust; lewd; indecent; obscene; sexual impurity; tending to 
deprave the morals in respect to sexual relations; licentious." 
Black's Law Dictionary 882 (6th ed. 1990).  Hence, as used in the 
child pornography statute, the ordinary meaning of the phrase 
"lascivious exhibition" means a depiction which displays or 
brings forth to view in order to attract notice to the genitals 
or pubic area of children, in order to excite lustfulness or 
sexual stimulation in the viewer.  Such a definition does not 
contain any requirement of nudity, and accords with the multi-
factor test announced in United States v. Dost0 for determining 
                     
0636 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. Cal. 1986), aff'd sub nom. United States 
v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 856, 
108 S. Ct. 164 (1987). The Dost factors were articulated in order 
to provide a more concrete test for determining whether a visual 
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whether certain material falls within the definition of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2256(E)(2).  Nor does such a definition contain or suggest a 
requirement that the contours of the genitals or pubic area be 
discernible or otherwise visible through the child subject's 
clothing. 
 The genitals and pubic area of the young girls in the 
Nather tapes were certainly "on display" as the camera focused 
for prolonged time intervals on close-up views of these body 
                                                                  
depiction of a minor constitutes a "lascivious exhibition of the 
genitals or pubic area" under 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(E): 
 
1) whether the focal point of the visual depiction is 
on the child's genitalia or pubic area; 
2) whether the setting of the visual depiction is 
sexually suggestive, i.e., in a place or pose generally 
associated with sexual activity; 
3) whether the child is depicted in an unnatural pose, 
or in inappropriate attire, considering the age of the 
child; 
4) whether the child is fully or partially clothed, or 
nude; 
5) whether the visual depiction suggests sexual coyness 
or a willingness to engage in sexual activity; 
6) whether the visual depiction is intended or designed 
to elicit a sexual response in the viewer. 
 
636 F. Supp. at 832.  The court readily admitted that this list 
is not exhaustive as other factors may be relevant in particular 
cases.  Id. 
 
 We formally adopted the Dost factors as the relevant 
test for determining lasciviousness in United States v. Villard, 
885 F.2d 117, 122 (3d Cir. 1989).  The analysis is qualitative 
and no single factor is dispositive.  Id.  Other federal courts 
have also relied on the Dost factors for this purpose.  See 
United States v. Arvin, 900 F.2d 1385, 1390-91 & n.4 (9th Cir. 
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1024, 111 S. Ct. 672 (1991); United 
States v. Wolf, 890 F.2d 241, 244-46 (10th Cir. 1989); United 
States v. Rubio, 834 F.2d 442, 448 (5th Cir. 1987) (discussing 
the six Dost factors without citing to the Dost case); United 
States v. Nolan, 818 F.2d 1015, 1019 n.5 (1st Cir. 1987); United 
States v. Mr. A., 756 F. Supp. 326, 328-29 (E.D. Mich. 1991). 
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parts through their thin but opaque clothing.  Additionally, the 
obvious purpose and inevitable effect of the videotape was to 
"attract notice" specifically to the genitalia and pubic area. 
Applying the plain meaning of the term "lascivious exhibition" 
leads to the conclusion that nudity or discernibility are not 
prerequisites for the occurrence of an exhibition within the 
meaning of the federal child pornography statute.0 
 Our task of further examining the statutory language in 
light of the Solicitor General's position also requires us to 
address whether in our prior opinion we overlooked a requirement 
that the minor subjects be engaged in conduct that can be judged 
"lascivious."  According to the government, this interpretation 
of the statute is made necessary by the statutory language of 18 
U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)(A) and (a)(4)(B)(i), which criminalize the 
possession of material depicting "the use of a minor engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct."  Id. (emphasis added).  Since 
"sexually explicit conduct" is defined to include "actual or 
simulated lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of 
any person," id. § 2256(2)(E), the government concludes that 
depictions "come within the statute only if they show minors 
engaged in the conduct of lasciviously exhibiting their (or 
                     
0We note that were we to agree with the government that the 
correct statutory standard requires the minor subject's genitals 
or pubic area to be discernible through his or her clothing, we 
would have no trouble upholding Knox's conviction.  We have 
viewed the Nather tapes.  In several sequences, the photographer 
has focused unnaturally on the genitals of the young girls in 
close-up shots which reveal the outer contours of the genitals 
through their tight bathing suits, leotards, or underwear. 
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someone else's) genitals or pubic areas."  Gov't Sup. Ct. Brief 
(Sept. 1993) at 13. 
 In its brief after remand, the government recedes 
somewhat from the view implied by its Supreme Court brief that 
the depiction must show the child subject to have some lascivious 
intent.  The government now argues only that the material must 
depict some conduct by the child subject, which includes a 
"lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area," and which 
appeals to the lascivious interest of some potential audience. 
Although the government maintains that we did not address this 
aspect of the statute, and that a complete statutory 
interpretation should include this element, it argues that "the 
tapes in this case easily meet that requirement of the statute." 
Gov't Brief (March 1994) at 15. 
 The government is correct that in our prior opinion we 
did not specifically address this aspect of the statute.  We did 
not do so because neither Knox nor the government presented for 
review or argued this aspect of the statute as something the 
court needed to address in order to decide the case.  Upon 
consideration of the meaning of this statutory language, we 
reject any contention, whether implied by the government or not, 
that the child subject must be shown to have engaged in sexually 
explicit conduct with a lascivious intent. 
 In United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239, 1244-45 
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 856, 108 S. Ct. 164 (1987), 
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed this very 
question.  The court stated: 
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In the context of the statute applied to the conduct of 
children, lasciviousness is not a characteristic of the 
child photographed but of the exhibition which the 
photographer sets up for an audience that consists of 
himself or like-minded pedophiles. . . .  The picture 
of a child "engaged in sexually explicit conduct" 
within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251 and 2252 as 
defined by [§ 2256(2)(E)] is a picture of a child's sex 
organs displayed lasciviously--that is, so presented by 
the photographer as to arouse or satisfy the sexual 
cravings of a voyeur. 
Id. at 1244.  See also United States v. Cross, 928 F.2d 1030, 
1042-43 n.34 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 112 S. 
Ct. 594 (1991), and __ U.S. __, 112 S. Ct. 941 (1992); Arvin, 900 
F.2d at 1389; Mr. A., 756 F. Supp. at 329; United States v. 
McCormick, 675 F. Supp. 223, 224 (M.D. Pa. 1987). 
 Children posing for pornographic pictures may suffer 
dramatic harm regardless of whether they have an "adult" look of 
sexual invitation or coyness on their face.  Therefore, we adhere 
to the view that "lasciviousness" is an inquiry that the finder 
of fact must make using the Dost factors and any other relevant 
factors given the particularities of the case, which does not 
involve an inquiry concerning the intent of the child subject. 
Our interpretation of the "lasciviousness" element is consistent 
with the plain meaning of the statute and furthers Congress' 
intent in eradicating the pervasive harm children experience when 
subjected to posing for pornographic purposes. 
 Thus, we conclude that a "lascivious exhibition of the 
genitals or pubic area" of a minor necessarily requires only that 
the material depict some "sexually explicit conduct" by the minor 
subject which appeals to the lascivious interest of the intended 
audience.  Applying this standard in the present case, it is 
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readily apparent that the tapes in evidence violate the statute. 
In several sequences, the minor subjects, clad only in very tight 
leotards, panties, or bathing suits, were shown specifically 
spreading or extending their legs to make their genital and pubic 
region entirely visible to the viewer.  In some of these poses, 
the child subject was shown dancing or gyrating in a fashion 
indicative of adult sexual relations.  Nearly all of these scenes 
were shot in an outdoor playground or park setting where children 
are normally found.  Although none of these factors is alone 
dispositive, the totality of these factors lead us to conclude 
that the minor subjects were engaged in conduct--namely, the 
exhibition of their genitals or pubic area--which would appeal to 
the lascivious interest of an audience of pedophiles. 
 Since the statutory language does not suggest that a 
nude exhibition is necessary, Knox bears the burden of 
demonstrating a clear contrary congressional intent to warrant 
importing into the statute an unexpressed requirement of nudity. 
See Malloy, 860 F.2d at 1183.  In our prior opinion, we reviewed 
the legislative history and concluded that it supported our 
interpretation of the statutory language.  See United States v. 
Knox, 977 F.2d 815, 820-21 (3d Cir. 1992), vacated and remanded, 
__ U.S. __, 114 S. Ct. 375 (1993).  After further examining the 
relevant legislative history, however, we conclude that it is 
wholly silent as to whether Congress intended the statutory term 
"lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area" to 
encompass non-nude depictions of these body parts. 
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 The legislative proposal before the original child 
pornography statute was enacted in 1977 would have proscribed 
"nudity, which nudity is depicted for the purpose of sexual 
stimulation or gratification of any individual who may view such 
depiction."  S. 1011, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1977).  Since 
Congress considered including nudity as an element of a criminal 
depiction, we continue to believe that the decision to eliminate 
this requirement must be deemed intentional.  Thus, when Congress 
passed the 1977 Act prohibiting a "lewd exhibition of the 
genitals or pubic area of any person," it may have desired to 
criminalize both clothed and unclothed visual images of a child's 
genitalia if they were lewd.0  Clearly, Congress could have 
expressly limited the statute's scope to encompass only naked 
displays by prohibiting the "lascivious exhibition of the nude 
genitals or pubic area of any person."  But this is not the 
language Congress included in the statute.0 
                     
0A subsequent amendment, the Child Protection Act of 1984, 
replaced "lewd" with the word "lascivious," but the two words 
have nearly identical meanings.  United States v. Wiegand, 812 
F.2d 1239, 1243 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 856, 108 S.Ct. 
164 (1987). 
0Furthermore, Congress failed to articulate anywhere in its 
extensive legislative history any desire that the statute, as 
enacted, prohibit only nude portrayals, or only depictions in 
which the minor subject's genitals or pubic area are discernible 
or at least somewhat visible.  See H.R. Rep. No. 99-910, 99th 
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5952-59; 
S. Rep. No. 98-169, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1983), reprinted in 
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 492; H.R. Rep. No. 98-536, 98th Cong., 2nd 
Sess. (1983); S. Rep. No. 95-438, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1977), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 40-68; H.R. Rep. No. 95-696, 95th 
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 69-71; 
H.R. Conf. Rep. 99-910, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1977). 
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 Appellant Knox and the government, however, rely on a 
letter from the Justice Department outlining its views concerning 
S. 1001, the original proposed bill (containing the nudity 
language), as evidence that Congress assumed that an exhibition 
meant a nude, or as the government contends at least a 
discernible, exhibition of the genitals or pubic area.  See 
Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation: Hearings 
before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the 
Comm. of the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 77-78 (1977), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 63 (letter from Patricia M. Wald, 
Assistant Attorney General to James O. Eastland, Chairman, 
Committee of the Judiciary).  After suggesting that "lewd 
exhibition of the genitals" replace the proposed nudity language, 
the Assistant Attorney General stated, "Congress could make clear 
in the legislative history of the bill what types of nude 
portrayals of children were intended to be encompassed within 
this definition."  Id.  Upon reexamination, we believe there are 
two plausible interpretations of this letter and, thus, we 
conclude that it is not helpful in determining Congress' intent. 
 Under the first interpretation, which we adopted in our 
prior opinion, the Wald letter assumes that Congress only desired 
to prohibit nude exhibitions because at that time the language of 
the proposed bill included the word "nudity."  By subsequently 
eliminating the word "nudity," Congress appears to have 
repudiated its earlier intention to confine the statute's 
coverage to nude exhibitions.  Alternatively, it is arguably 
significant that the language suggesting that Congress clarify 
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what types of nude portrayals would be prohibited was contained 
in the very letter recommending the substitution of the phrase 
"lewd exhibition of the genitals" for the original nudity 
language.  Protection of Children, supra, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 
77-78.  In light of this legislative history, Knox and the 
government submit that Congress omitted any reference to nudity 
in the statute by replacing it with the phrase "lewd exhibition 
of the genitals or pubic area," which does not encompass any 
depiction of completely clothed, or non-discernible, genitals or 
pubic area. 
 Because we find both interpretations of this letter 
plausible, and the legislative history in toto to be silent as to 
whether Congress intended the statute to reach non-nude 
depictions, we do not rely on it in adhering to our prior 
statutory interpretation.0  We conclude that Knox has not met his 
                     
0Nor do we rely on the legislative pronouncements concerning this 
statute and case recently passed by both houses of Congress. On 
November 4, 1993, the Senate unanimously adopted an amendment to 
an unrelated bill confirming "the intent of Congress" that 18 
U.S.C. § 2256(2)(E) "is not limited to nude exhibitions or 
exhibitions in which the outlines of those areas [are] 
discernible through clothing."  139 Cong. Rec. S14,976 (Daily 
ed., Nov. 4, 1993).  Subsequently on April 20, 1994, the House of 
Representatives passed by a vote of 425-3 a similar nonbinding 
resolution expressing the sense of Congress that "the Department 
of Justice has used its brief in the Knox case as a vehicle for 
reinterpretation of the child pornography laws in contravention 
to legislative history," and that "Congress specifically 
repudiated a nudity requirement for child pornography statutes." 
140 Cong. Rec. H2536 (Daily ed., Apr. 20, 1994). 
 
 These resolutions are post-enactment legislative 
history which should be given little, if any, weight because they 
do not necessarily reflect the intent of the members of Congress 
who originally enacted the statutory language.  As Justice Scalia 
stated concerning subsequent legislative history: 
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burden of proving that Congress intended the statute to reach 
only a nude "lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic 
area."  Thus, we will not read a nudity requirement into a 
statute that has none. 
 The underlying rationale for the federal child 
pornography laws also supports the conclusion that clothed 
exhibitions of the genitalia are proscribed.  When an obscenity 
statute is challenged as unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment, the Supreme Court balances the government's interest 
in protecting the sensibilities of unwilling recipients from 
exposure to pornography against the dangers of government 
censorship.  Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607 
                                                                  
 
"Subsequent legislative history"--which presumably 
means the post-enactment history of a statute's 
consideration and enactment--is a contradiction in 
terms.  The phrase is used to smuggle into judicial 
consideration legislators' expressions not of what a 
bill currently under consideration means (which, the 
theory goes, reflects what their colleagues understood 
they were voting for), but of what a law previously 
enacted means. 
. . . 
 Arguments based on subsequent legislative history, 
like arguments based on antecedent futurity, should not 
be taken seriously, not even in a footnote. 
 
Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 631-32, 110 S. Ct. 2658, 
2667 (1990) (Scalia, J, concurring in part). 
 
 The language of the child pornography statute at issue 
in this case was enacted in 1977, and amended in 1984.  Since 
that time there has been such a large turnover in Congress that a 
majority of the legislators who voted for the recent legislative 
pronouncements had no role in the passage of the original 
statute.  Thus, we do not consider the subsequent legislative 
history as providing any indication that the enacting Congress 
intended the scope of the child pornography statute to cover non-
nude depictions. 
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(1973).  Because the government interest, although legitimate, is 
not compelling, regulation of obscene materials is limited to 
works which "appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which 
portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, 
taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value."  Id. at 24, 93 S. Ct. at 2615. 
 The Supreme Court allows the states and Congress 
greater leeway to regulate and proscribe pornography that depicts 
minors as distinguished from adults since the harmful effects 
suffered by a child are palpably more severe.  New York v. 
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-61, 102 S. Ct. 3348, 3354-57 (1982). 
The Court relaxes the Miller obscenity test when pornographic 
material portrays minors since the government's interest in 
"safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a 
minor" is "compelling."  Id. at 756-57, 102 S. Ct. at 3354 
(quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 
607, 102 S. Ct. 2613, 2620 (1982)).  The use of children as 
subjects of pornographic materials is harmful to the 
physiological, emotional, and mental health of the child.  Id. at 
757, 102 S. Ct. at 3355; Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109, 110 
S. Ct. 1691, 1696 (1990).  The psychological effect of visually 
recording the sexual exploitation of a child is devastating and 
its elimination is of "surpassing importance."  Ferber, 458 U.S. 
at 757, 102 S. Ct. at 3355.  Since the child's image is 
permanently recorded, the pornography may haunt him or her for a 
lifetime because the child will be aware that the offensive 
photograph or film is circulating through the masses.  Id. at 759 
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n.10, 102 S. Ct. at 3355 n.10 (quoting Shouvlin, Preventing the 
Sexual Exploitation of Children: A Model Act, 17 Wake Forest L. 
Rev. 535, 545 (1981)).  The crime is the affront to the dignity 
and privacy of the child and the exploitation of the child's 
vulnerability: 
Human dignity is offended by the pornographer. American 
law does not protect all human dignity; legally, an 
adult can consent to its diminishment. When a child is 
made the target of the pornographer-photographer, the 
statute will not suffer the insult to the human spirit, 
that the child should be treated as a thing. 
United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239, 1245 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 484 U.S. 856, 108 S. Ct. 164 (1987).  Additionally, 
controlling the production and dissemination of child pornography 
is of paramount importance since pedophiles often use child 
pornography to seduce other children into performing sexual acts. 
Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111, 110 S. Ct. at 1697. 
 To vindicate the compelling government interest in 
protecting the safety and welfare of children, not only is the 
spectrum of constitutionally unprotected pornographic material 
broader when the subjects are children rather than adults, but 
also the arsenal of available enforcement mechanisms is more 
extensive.  For instance, the mere possession of child 
pornography, even in one's home, may be criminalized although 
only distribution of obscenity depicting adults can be 
proscribed.  Compare Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568, 89 S. 
Ct. 1243, 1249 (1969) (Georgia statute outlawing private 
possession of obscenity violates the First Amendment) with 
Osborne, 495 U.S. at 108, 110 S. Ct. at 1695-97 (Ohio statute 
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criminalizing possession of child pornography upheld against 
First Amendment challenge due to the compelling interest in 
protecting minors). 
 The harm Congress attempted to eradicate by enacting 
the child pornography laws is present when a photographer 
unnaturally focuses on a minor child's clothed genital area with 
the obvious intent to produce an image sexually arousing to 
pedophiles.  The child is treated as a sexual object and the 
permanent record of this embarrassing and humiliating experience 
produces the same detrimental effects to the mental health of the 
child as a nude portrayal.  The rationale underlying the 
statute's proscription applies equally to any lascivious 
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area whether these areas are 
clad or completely exposed. 
 Knox next asserts that our decision in United States v. 
Villard, 885 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1989), mandates that the genitals 
or pubic area be exposed before an exhibition may occur.  In 
Villard, we stated that "more than merely nudity" was required 
for a violation of the statute; otherwise, "inclusion of the term 
`lascivious' would be meaningless."  Id. at 121.  The requirement 
of more than mere nudity does not mean, as Knox contends, that 
nudity is a prerequisite to the existence of an exhibition; 
rather, Villard simply stated the obvious principle that nudity 
alone is insufficient to constitute a lascivious exhibition.  No 
one seriously could think that a Renoir painting of a nude woman 
or an innocuous family snapshot of a naked child in the bathtub 
violates the child pornography laws.  Nudity must be coupled with 
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other circumstances that make the visual depiction lascivious or 
sexually provocative in order to fall within the parameters of 
the statute.  Such was our holding in Villard, which addressed 
whether sufficient evidence existed to justify a finding of 
lasciviousness. 
 In our prior opinion we went on to state that our 
holding in Villard provides support for our conclusion that a 
"lascivious exhibition" includes non-nude depictions of a minor's 
genitals or pubic area.  See Knox, 977 F.2d at 822-23.  We came 
to that conclusion because inclusion of the fourth Dost factor, 
"whether the child is fully or partially clothed, or nude," 
seemed to "rest[] on the implicit assumption that a clothed 
exhibition of the genitals is criminalized under the statute." 
Id. at 823.  Knox argues that our reliance on this authority was 
misplaced because the determination of whether a certain 
depiction visually displays the minor subject's genitals or pubic 
area is a threshold inquiry required by the language of the 
statute itself, whereas consideration of the Dost factors is 
relevant only for the later determination of whether that 
depiction is lascivious.  See United States v. Arvin, 900 F.2d 
1385, 1391 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1024, 111 S. Ct. 
672 (1991).  Knox further contends that it is possible for a 
minor subject to be fully clothed and still exhibit his or her 
fully exposed genitals--e.g., a well directed side-angle camera 
shot could reveal the genitals through an opening in the 
subject's shorts or skirt. 
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 Upon further consideration, we agree with Knox and the 
Arvin court that the question whether the depiction at issue 
visually exhibits the genitals or pubic area is a threshold 
determination not necessarily guided by the Dost factors. 
However, we do not agree that the Dost factors are completely 
irrelevant to this threshold determination.  For instance, the 
first Dost factor, "whether the focal point of the visual 
depiction is on the child's genitalia or pubic area," 636 F. 
Supp. at 832, may play an important role in the determination of 
whether the child subject's genitals or pubic area are on exhibit 
within the meaning of the statute.  Nevertheless, although the 
fourth Dost factor arguably provides no support for our 
interpretation of the statute as reaching lascivious depictions 
of a child's fully covered genitals or pubic area, it is clearly 
not inconsistent with that interpretation. 
 After giving further consideration to the language of 
the statute, its legislative history, the underlying rationale 
for the federal child pornography laws, and the brief of 
Solicitor General submitted on behalf of the United States, we 
hold that the statutory term "lascivious exhibition of the 
genitals or pubic area," as used in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(E), does 
not contain any requirement that the child subject's genitals or 
pubic area be fully or partially exposed or discernible through 
his or her opaque clothing.  The statutory language is clear and 
contains no ambiguity.  Therefore, the rule of lenity should not 
be applied to defeat the clear intent of Congress to prohibit the 
possession of child pornography to the maximum extent allowable 
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under the Constitution.  See, e.g., National Org. for Women, Inc. 
v. Scheidler, __ U.S. __, __, 114 S. Ct. 798, 806 (1994) ("the 
rule of lenity applies only when an ambiguity is present; 'it is 
not used to beget one'" (quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 
U.S. 576, 587-88 n.10, 101 S. Ct. 2524, 2531 n.10 (1981)); 
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427, 105 S. Ct. 2084, 
2089 (1985) ("the rule of lenity is not to be applied where to do 
so would conflict with the implied or expressed intent of 
Congress"); United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 509-10, 75 
S. Ct. 504, 508 (1955).0 
 
V. 
                     
0Knox contends that because his prosecution and conviction for 
violating the federal child pornography laws was the first 
involving materials which contain absolutely no nudity, the rule 
of lenity must be applied.  At the outset, we repeat that the 
rule of lenity does not apply in this case because the statutory 
language contains no ambiguity.  We also reject this contention 
because it misconceives the object of the rule of lenity and 
would produce an absurd result.  First, the application of the 
rule of lenity is not dependent whatsoever on whether there have 
been successful prosecutions under the statute at issue.  Cf., 
e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, __ U.S. __, __, 114 S. Ct. 655, 
662-63 (1994) (Court applied the rule of lenity because of an 
ambiguity in the statute, even though there had been many 
previous successful prosecutions under the statute).  The rule of 
lenity "'comes into operation at the end of the process of 
construing what Congress has expressed, not at the beginning as 
an overriding consideration of being lenient to wrong-doers.'" 
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 29, 104 S. Ct. 296, 303 
(1983) (quoting Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596, 81 
S. Ct. 321, 326 (1961)); see also United States v. Pollen, 978 
F.2d 78, 85 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 113 S. Ct. 
2332 (1993).  Second, if we were to agree with Knox's argument, 
then the government would never be able to successfully prosecute 
a person for violating a newly enacted criminal statute, nor 
would the government be able to successfully proceed under a 
theory different from that which has yielded convictions in the 
past. 
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 Interpreting an "exhibition of the genitals or pubic 
area" to include a clothed display of these areas does not render 
the statute unconstitutionally overbroad.0  The function of the 
First Amendment overbreadth doctrine is to prevent broadly worded 
statutes which control constitutionally unprotected conduct from 
deterring constitutionally protected expression.  Invalidating a 
statute as overbroad, however, is an exceptional remedy and 
should be employed sparingly and only as a last resort since it 
is "strong medicine."  Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613, 
93 S. Ct. 2908, 2916 (1973).  Before a child pornography statute 
is declared unconstitutional, the overbreadth must "not only be 
real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the 
statute's plainly legitimate sweep."  Id. at 615, 93 S. Ct. at 
2918.  The requirement of substantial overbreadth is equally 
applicable to challenges that arise in defense of a criminal 
prosecution.  Ferber, 458 U.S. at 772-74, 102 S. Ct. at 3363. 
 In Ferber, the Supreme Court held that the New York 
statute which criminalized the "lewd exhibition of the genitals" 
was not constitutionally overbroad.  Id.  Although some protected 
expression, ranging from medical textbooks to National Geographic 
photographs, could possibly be reached by the statute, this tiny 
fraction of materials within the statute's coverage could be 
protected by case-by-case analysis.  Id.  Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the constitutional 
                     
0The term "pubic area" cannot be challenged as vague or overbroad 
since Knox contends, and we agree, that this phrase describes a 
precise anatomical region. 
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rights of adults to obtain, possess, or use sexually explicit 
material may be limited in order to protect children from 
exposure to these materials and from sexual exploitation.  See 
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 634-43, 88 S. Ct. 1274, 1277-
82 (1968) (the right to publish and distribute non-obscene 
material may be limited by banning its sale to minors); Ferber, 
458 U.S. at 756, 102 S. Ct. at 3354 ("States are entitled to 
greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic depictions of 
children" than in protecting against obscenity). 
 Knox's prediction that our interpretation of an 
exhibition will result in prosecutors leafing through family 
albums and church bulletins containing innocent pictures of fully 
clothed children and pressing charges is unfounded.  The limiting 
principle in the statute is the requirement of lasciviousness.0 A 
visual depiction of a child subject's genitals or pubic area, 
whether the child is clothed or naked, must be lascivious in 
order to be proscribed.  Whether a depiction is lascivious is 
essentially an inquiry into whether or not the material meets the 
standard of lasciviousness as guided by the Dost factors. 
Villard, 885 F.2d at 122; see supra note 10.  Only a minuscule 
fraction of all pictures of minor children will be sufficiently 
sexually suggestive and unnaturally focused on the genitalia to 
qualify as lascivious.  Even fewer images where a minor's genital 
                     
0The issue is not raised in this case, but we note that although 
the meaning of lasciviousness is far from crystal clear, it is 
not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.  See United States v. 
O'Malley, 854 F.2d 1085, 1086-87 (8th Cir. 1988); Wiegand, 812 
F.2d at 1243. 
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area is not fully exposed will constitute lascivious exhibitions 
since the fact that a child's genital area is covered is a factor 
militating against a finding of lasciviousness.  Thus, including 
scantily clothed displays of the genitals within the meaning of 
an exhibition leaves the statute "directed at the hard core of 
child pornography," Ferber, 458 U.S. at 773, 102 S. Ct. at 3363, 
which results in leaving an indelible psychological scar on the 
exploited child.  Our interpretation simply declines to create an 
absolute immunity for pornographers who pander to pedophiles by 
using as their subjects children whose genital areas are barely 
covered. 
 
VI. 
 On remand, Knox again contends that insufficient 
evidence was presented at trial for a trier of fact to have 
found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that (1) the Nather tapes 
traveled through the mail in interstate commerce; and (2) Knox 
"knowingly" received child pornography through the mail and 
"knowingly" possessed three pornographic videotapes.  Generally, 
this court must examine the evidence as a whole in the light most 
favorable to the government, and must sustain a conviction if 
there is substantial evidence to support it.  United States v. 
Carr, No. 93-1796, 1994 WL 237007, at *4-5 (3d Cir. June 3, 
1994).  When we previously rejected Knox's arguments on this 
point, we noted that Knox had not timely filed his post-trial 
motion for acquittal, and thus indicated that the sufficiency of 
evidence issues might be reviewed only for plain error.  Knox, 
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977 F.2d at 824.  Nevertheless, we concluded that we did not need 
to determine whether "the plain error test and the sufficiency of 
evidence standard are essentially equivalent inquiries" because 
the government fulfilled the more stringent standard of 
establishing that the evidence was sufficient "to support the 
district court's finding that the Nather tapes traveled through 
the mail and that Knox knowingly received and possessed those 
films."  Id. 
 In its brief submitted to the Supreme Court, the 
government indicated that we were mistaken in reviewing the 
evidence only for plain error.  Gov't Sup. Ct. Brief (Sept. 1993) 
at 21-22 n.10.  We acknowledge that the analysis following our 
introductory paragraph quoted above was somewhat unclear as to 
whether we were applying the plain error or sufficiency of 
evidence test.  We now clarify the conclusion expressed in our 
prior opinion that the government did indeed introduce sufficient 
evidence for the district court to conclude beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Knox knowingly received the Nather films and that 
those films traveled through the mail. 
 To establish interstate mailing, the government 
introduced evidence that Knox rented a mailbox under a fictitious 
name and that he received other pornographic materials at that 
mailbox.  When agents searched Knox's apartment pursuant to a 
valid search warrant, they discovered advertisements from Nather 
with checkmarks next to several videotapes and envelopes, pre-
addressed to Nather, with forms to order Nather tapes.  One of 
the videos marked in the catalog was included as a segment of a 
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compilation tape found in Knox's apartment.  A carbon copy of a 
$62 money order payable to Nather was also seized from Knox's 
apartment.  Sixty-two dollars is the approximate price of a 
single Nather tape.  Knox is correct that the government never 
introduced direct evidence that Nather mailed tapes to Knox's 
rented mailbox.  A trier of fact, however, may consider direct 
and circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences to be 
drawn therefrom. 
 The above facts provide strong circumstantial support 
that Nather, a Nevada mail order video company without any 
offices in Pennsylvania, at some point utilized the postal system 
to cause the tapes it distributes to be discovered in Knox's 
apartment in Pennsylvania.  Cf. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 
398, 415-17, 90 S. Ct. 642, 652-53 (1970) (although some heroin 
is produced in this country, the vast majority of heroin is 
produced abroad; thus, jury could permissibly infer, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that defendant possessed a smuggled drug).  The 
circumstantial evidence was sufficient for the district court to 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the Nather films traveled 
through the interstate mails. 
 The record also contains sufficient evidence for the 
district court to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Knox 
"knowingly" received and possessed the Nather tapes.  Knox 
maintains that the absence of nudity in the films and the 
disclaimers in the Nather brochures that the videos were legal to 
purchase and own disproves the mens rea element of § 2252.  We 
have previously held that the mens rea requirement of § 2252 
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"does not require that a recipient of child pornography know the 
precise contents of such materials."  United States v. Brown, 862 
F.2d 1033, 1036 (3d Cir. 1988).  In Brown, the defendant ordered 
one film, but accidentally received a different tape.  Since the 
defendant knew the video he requested was child pornography, we 
deemed it irrelevant that he did not know the exact contents of 
the substituted tape actually mailed to him. 
 Knox's argument in this case is somewhat different.  He 
claims that although he knew the contents of the Nather tapes, he 
was unaware that the videos were child pornography and believed 
they were legal to own.  To address this contention, we look to 
the Supreme Court's interpretation of a strikingly similar 
statute for guidance.  To fulfill the "knowingly" requirement of 
18 U.S.C. § 1461 (the obscenity law concerning adults),0 the 
Supreme Court held that the prosecution need only show that the 
defendant had knowledge of the contents, character, and nature of 
the materials.  Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 123, 94 S. 
Ct. 2887, 2910 (1974).  To require proof that the defendant knew 
the materials were obscene, and thus illegal to distribute, would 
allow defendants to avoid prosecution by claiming ignorance of 
the relevant law.  Id.  It would be ironic to construe the same 
word, "knowingly," in the analogous child pornography law as more 
lenient to criminal defendants since the purpose for enacting the 
                     
0Title 18 U.S.C. § 1461 provides in pertinent part: "Whoever 
knowingly uses the mails for the mailing, carriage in the mails, 
or delivery of anything declared by this section . . . to be 
nonmailable . . . shall be fined not more than $5,000 or 
imprisoned not more than five years, or both . . . ." 
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child pornography statute was to create more stringent regulation 
for child pornography than already existed through the generally 
applicable obscenity laws.  Therefore, to fulfill the knowledge 
element of § 2252, a defendant simply must be aware of the 
general nature and character of the material and need not know 
that the portrayals are illegal.  See United States v. Moncini, 
882 F.2d 401, 404 (9th Cir. 1989) (no need to prove knowledge of 
illegality under § 2252); United States v. Tolczeki, 614 F. Supp. 
1424, 1429 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (same).  The child pornography laws 
would be eviscerated if a pedophile's personal opinion about the 
legality of sexually explicit videos was transformed into the 
applicable law. 
 There is no doubt that Knox was aware of the nature of 
the Nather tapes when he received them.  Newsletters from Nather 
found in Knox's apartment described the contents of the films--
"girls between the ages of 11 and 17 showing so much panty and 
ass you'll get dizzy . . . so revealing it's almost like seeing 
them naked"--and the video's intended effects--"Sassy Sylphs will 
blow your mind so completely you'll be begging for mercy."  Knox 
handwrote his own descriptions of the Nather films on the outside 
of the boxes.  For instance, on the Nather II tape, Knox wrote 
"13-year old flashes" followed by "hot."  Knox characterizes the 
second vignette as "15 year old shows nipple."  Both Nather's and 
Knox's descriptions of the tapes clearly demonstrate that Knox 
was aware that the videotapes contained sexually oriented 
materials designed to sexually arouse a pedophile.  Sufficient 
evidence was presented at the bench trial to support a finding 
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that Knox was aware of the nature of the Nather tapes, and 
therefore knowingly possessed and received them. 
 Even if a reasonable mistake as to the legality of the 
material was recognized as a defense, the language of the statute 
is clear that nudity is not a prerequisite for a lascivious 
exhibition.  Additionally, relying on Nather's disclaimer is 
tantamount to asking a hard core pornographer for legal advice as 
to whether the material he earns a living by selling is legal. 
Nather's disclaimer could not reasonably lead Knox to believe 
that the videotapes were legal.  If anything, the need to profess 
legality should have alerted Knox to the films' dubious legality. 
 
 
VII. 
 In sum, after further consideration of the statutory 
language, legislative history, the purpose of Congress in passing 
the federal child pornography statute, and the Solicitor 
General's brief submitted in the Supreme Court, we hold that a 
"lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area" pursuant to 
18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(E) encompasses visual depictions of a child's 
genitals or pubic area even when these areas are covered by an 
article of clothing and are not discernible.  Our interpretation 
of the statutory language does not render the statute 
unconstitutionally overbroad since the requirement of 
lasciviousness limits the proscribed depictions to 
constitutionally unprotected expression.  Finally, there was 
sufficient record evidence for the district court to conclude 
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beyond a reasonable doubt that Knox knowingly received and 
possessed the videotapes and that the films traveled through 
interstate mail.  The judgment of conviction will therefore be 
affirmed. 
 
